Composition of high-speed protocols from basic protocol mechanisms can help to realize the exible application-speci c selection of protocols. For the purpose of formal speci cation, functional modelling, analysis, and veri cation of composed protocols we apply L. Lamport's Temporal Logic of Actions (TLA). We propose a modular and compositional style of speci cation, which supports the analysis of functional interrelationships between service requirements and protocol mechanisms and facilitates the veri cation of protocols by the compositional structuring of proofs. The approach is introduced in principle and explained by means of an example.
Introduction
The performance of modern high-speed networks strongly depends on the functions of communication protocol entities and their implementation. The nodes are prone to be performance bottlenecks and`light' protocols have been proposed in order to support e cient implementations 6]. As even e cient implementations of general light protocols can induce performance problems, an ongoing approach proposes the exible selection of protocols applied. Since di erent applications have speci c functional and performance requirements 5], the choice of protocols can depend on the actual functional and quality requirements of a speci c application association and can reduce the complexity of node functions 4, 7, 13, 17, 19] .
On the other hand the approach of exible protocol selection also poses new central problems. A broad spectrum of protocols has to be de ned { preferably by standards {, implementations have to be available at runtime, and the protocol selection e ciently has to be performed. Instead of few protocols, a large set of protocols has to be managed and made available with respect to speci cations and implementations. A possible solution for the de nition and management of a broader protocol spectrum is based on composition. 7, 14, 19] identify components of protocols, namely protocol mechanisms which correspond to components of services, to service requirements. The spectrum of protocols can be de ned indirectly by the de nition of components and principles for their combination. The protocol selection utilizes the correspondence between service requirements and protocol mechanisms and is performed by the computation of a suitable mechanism composition. The implementation can fall back to given component implementations and { at runtime { only has to establish speci c instantiations and couplings of components. Thus, the composition of protocol mechanisms can contribute to the solution of central problems of exible protocol selection.
Our approach concentrates on the functional aspects of composition and proposes a solution for the subproblems of formal modelling and modular speci cation of components and composed systems. Also, it supports the analysis of the correspondences between functional service requirements and protocol mechanisms and opens a suitable possibility for the veri cation of protocol compositions.
Protocols as well as communication services are viewed as compositions (cf. 5, 6, 9] . Services are conjunctions of service properties=service requirements which have the character of logical constraints. Protocols are combinations of protocol mechanisms which have the character of resource-consuming dynamically interacting processes. Formally protocols and services are modelled as event-discrete concurrent systems. A correct protocol is a re nement=implementation of the service provided. Composition is modelled formally and supported by a speci cation style which facilitates the syntactical description of combinations and supports the inference of system properties from component properties. Thus, complex protocol veri cations can be splitted into a set of simpler tasks by means of decomposition. The style can be applied to constraint-oriented component-processes as well as to resource-oriented component-processes (cf. 18]). Therefore services, protocols, and implementations can be modelled within the same framework. The application of the style is not restricted to high-speed protocols, but we see that the exible selection of high-speed protocols is an important eld of application in which our approach of formal composition can contribute to the solution of practical problems.
The approach is based on L. Lamports Temporal Logic of Actions (TLA 10]), a linear-time temporal logic which is well-suited to the description and veri cation of state-transition systems. Moreover it refers to the concept of Re nement Mappings 1] which supports the veri cation of re nements and implementations. Also we utilize the approach of compositions 2] which describes systems by the logical conjunction of component speci cations. In comparison with 2] we do not assume that the components interact via interface variables but follow up the more exible concept of Joint Actions which has been proposed in the context of Lotos 8] . The speci cation language is oriented at TLA+, a syntax for the modular notation of TLA-formulas 11].
At rst, the paper gives a short outline of TLA and re nement mappings. Then the principles of our compositional speci cation style and of the corresponding structured protocol veri cation are introduced. At last the application to high-speed protocols is exampli ed by means of some views to the Xpress By means of RM the veri cation of re nements can be facilitated substantially since the di erent RM-conditions R1; ::; R4 can be proven separately. In particular the main task of the safety proof R3 can be splitted in accordance with the action structure of the next-step relation of R. TLA is a very fundamental approach for the speci cation and veri cation of state transition systems. It does not provide for special means supporting the modelling of systems which are composed from concurrent processes, but the user very freely can choose a state transition based way of modelling. Concurrency and parallelism of process transitions will be re ected in the main in the next-step relation of the system. System actions which result from a strict interleaving of processes consist of a conjunction of one`real' process action and stuttering steps of the other processes. System actions which result from simultaneous process transitions consist of a conjunction of the corresponding process actions. Also combinations of interleaving and parallelism may be represented. However, di erent problems arise. The logical conjunction of process formulas may result in an inconsistent formula since subformulas may be in contradiction. The processes interact via shared variables. A composition theorem supports the inference of system properties from process formulas. It depends on speci c { but for resource-oriented processes realistic { assumptions on the process formulas.
Compositional speci cation style
For the speci cation of systems which are composed from concurrent processes we propose a speci cation style for TLA which is oriented at the modelling of CCS 12] and Lotos 8] . The processes do not communicate via shared variables. Interaction is performed by joint actions, by a set of processes simultaneously performing transitions. For the purpose of data communication between processes parametrized actions are used. An action act i (p : ptype i ) is a predicate over state variables, primed state variables, and the parameter tuple p. As in Lotos it stands for the class of actions which consists of the actions resulting from the di erent parameter substitutions. This { stateless { way of interaction has di erent bene ts, the most important to us is that resource-oriented processes as well as constraint-oriented processes can be represented (cf. 18]).
With respect to the openness=closedness of processes we also follow up CCS and Lotos. A process in principle is an open subsystem which a ects and is a ected by its environment. But a single process speci cation can be interpreted for its own. It re ects a closed system composed from the process and a process environment which is`universal' in the sense that all behaviours of the process are explored. With respect to possibly inconsistent compositions we restrict the processes to access private variables only. Therefore contradictions of safety properties of processes are not possible. To avoid fairness-contradictions, the fairness assumptions of processes are assumptions over conditioned actions. A conditioned action eact i (p : ptype i ) is the conjunction of the original action act i (p : ptype i ) and an environment condition: eact i (p : ptype i ) =act i (p)^p 2 e i . Here e i stands for an additional state variable which is set by the environment of P. It is assumed always to contain the set of parameter values for which the environment presently is ready, i.e., if p 2 e i then the environment will tolerate the action act i (p) in the next step. The di erent state variables e i are virtual. They do not correspond to real resources of a system. When regarding a process for its own each e i can be replaced by the value set of ptype i which is a constant set. When regarding a system each e i can be replaced by a function over the`real' state variables of the other processes of the system.
A process P is de ned by a canonical TLA-formula P: The formula P^2(e 1 = P:ptype 1^: :^e n = P:ptype n ) describes a separated process P and is equivalent to the integration of P into an environment which does not constrain the process P at all. By style convention the di erent actions P:act i of a process have to be disjoint to each other and to stuttering steps.
A system S which is composed from processes P 1 ; P 2 ; ::; P m is described by a TLA-formula S: S =P 1^P2^: :^P m^C C The di erent P j stand for the process formulas described above. Additionally the formula of the composition has a conjunctive term, the coupling constraint CC. CC is an invariant and describes the speci c coupling of the system. It can be structured into a conjunction of participation constraints P j C of the di erent processes:
CC =2(P 1 C^::^P m C) where a participation constraint again is a conjunction of two parts: P j C =P j CON^P j RED P j CON constrains the occurrence of P j -steps in system executions. It is a disjunction of Unchanged(P j :V ) (i.e., it tolerates all steps which do not change the private variables P j :V of P j ) and of action terms. For each action P j :act i of P j an action term is introduced: 9p 2 P j :ptype i : (P j :act i (p)^PeerActions)^StutteringRest PeerActions is a conjunction of actions of other processes which shall contribute to the same joint action:
PeerActions =P k :act o (p)^::^P l :act q (p)) If P j :act i is an internal action, i.e., if it is logically not connected with interactions on system level, then PeerActions equals to true. StutteringRest is a conjunction of Unchanged-statements for processes P r ; ::; P s which are not involved in a joint action with P j :act i :
StutteringRest =Unchanged(P r :V )^::^Unchanged(P s :V ) It describes the interleaving atomicity of P j :act i and may be set to true if parallelism with respect to logically non-connected actions shall be tolerated, too. Also, it is possible to postulate the interleaving atomicity of P j :act i only with respect to some subset of the other processes. In order to keep the system formula simple 6 we recommend to introduce interleaving as strict as it is possible with respect to a speci c system of interest.
The other part of P j C, P j RED states the substitution of the environment readiness variables P j :e i . It has to be chosen in accordance with the joint action terms of P j CON and is a conjunction of equations. For each interface action P j :act i of P j , an equation P j :e i = fp : Enabled(P k :act o (p))^::^Enabled(P l :act q (p))g has to be introduced where the processes and actions referenced are those of PeerActions of the corresponding action term. For internal actions P j :act i the equation P j :e i = P j :type i is introduced.
By style convention we assume that the di erent fairness assumptions of those process actions t together which contribute to the same joint action, i.e., all process actions of the same joint action must either be weak fair or strong fair or without any fairness condition.
The compositional system formula S =P Here S:Init is the conjunction of the processes' Init-predicates. The actions S:act i are conjunctions of process actions and Unchanged-statements (as it is guided by the P j CON). Due to the style conventions the fairness assumptions of system actions are inherited from the process actions' fairness. In more detail the speci cation style is de ned in terms of TLA+ 11] and takes pro t from TLA+ modules. A tool can support the de nition of system structures (e.g., interactive graphical editing of coupling constraints) and can compute the at formula.
Structured veri cation
The style conventions assure that a compositional system formula is free from contradictions and that it is equivalent to the corresponding` at' canonical formula. Therefore the processes are conjunctive terms of the system and process properties are inherited to the system. This supports a suitable structuring of veri cations which will be outlined by example of communication protocols as re nements of communication services.
Assume that a protocol system P is composed from a set of protocol mechanisms PP 1 ; PP 2 ; ::; PP n , and that a service system S is composed from a set of service property requirements SP 1 ; SP 2 ; ::; SP n . For the sake of simplicity we assume that each single protocol mechanism PP i provides for one functional service requirement 7 SP i (indeed, mostly a subset of protocol mechanisms provides for a speci c service property and one therefore has to rearrange the protocol system into a composition of compositions of basic mechanisms where the same basic mechanisms may occur in more than one subsystem).
We design the compositional formula P of the protocol system and the compositional formula S of the service system. The protocol veri cation has to prove the implication P ) S. Due to the given decomposition of P resp. S into suitable compositional forms the proof can be structured into n + 1 subproofs. At rst we proof for each i 2 f1::ng the implication PP i ) SP i , thus verifying the mechanisms separately. At last we have to prove that the two decompositions t together by means of the proof of the implication of the coupling constraints PCC ) SCC.
The proofs of the mechanisms are facilitated in comparison with the veri cation of monoliths since only a smaller part of the protocol and of the service are subjects to the proof (e.g., smaller set of state variables). Moreover, if a library of mechanisms and corresponding service requirements has been installed, the proofs may be re-used (or in the case of speci c instantiations of more genereal library schemes at least suitable invariants and other lemmata may be provided by the library). The proof of the two decompositions tting together formally is more complex than a mechanism proof since it concerns the state space of both systems at all. But due to the style conventions (disjointness of process actions) one can take pro t from intermediate results of mechanism proofs (namely the structure of the RM-mapping of protocol mechanism actions to service property actions) and can perform the proof quite mechanically.
Example
Some aspects of the high-speed transfer protocol XTP (Xpress Transfer Protocol) 15] will be regarded in order to clarify the application of TLA, of the compositional speci cation style, and of the decomposition-based structured veri cation. 6, 9, 16] distinguish between di erent mechanisms of XTP. Connection management supports implicit connection setups which facilitate the transfer of user data in the setup packets. Disconnection is performed either by 2-or by 3-way-handshake. The detection of lost data segments of byte stream transfers is based on block acknowledgements. Selective-repeat and go-back-n mechanisms trigger the retransimission. The loss recovery can be suspended for single data packets or for the data transfer of a connection as a whole. Hardware-implementable CRC-mechanisms can be applied to PDUs or to information elds of PDUs for the purpose of corruption detection which also can be suspended for single PDUs or for the connection as a whole. To support end-to-end ow control a receiver can send state information in order to induce the sender to adapt its transmission rate which also can be controlled by the Monolithical Service By means of the speci cation style proposed the di erent protocol mechanisms and the service constraints can be de ned modularily and the modules can be used as starting points for the composition of speci c con gurations. In the sequel we concentrate on data transfer mechanisms providing for a data stream transfer service which is reliable with respect to the absence of corruption, reordering, loss, and duplication. For the sake of simplicity the underlying network service is assumed to be reliable except that it may lose data packets, moreover we concentrate on safety aspects. In order to reduce the length of the presentation some TLA-speci cations of processes and systems are omitted and partially pictogramms will be used to outline processes.
The service as a whole can be speci ed by FIFO message queues each modelling one transfer direction. Fig. 1 outlines the queue and related actions of a service speci cation which is monolithic with respect to the required properties of the transfer of one direction. By means of the action submit the transfer of a message i to site d is requested at site s and is modelled by an enqueuing operation. The parameter nodc denotes the`no data corruption control' ag. The dequeuing action deliver models the indication at site dest.
At next we design a compositional service speci cation which is built from modular service constraint processes. We mention before that the service constraint processes could be speci ed more abstractly, in particular one not necessarily has to distribute the state. But in order to simplify the on-going veri cation we have chosen already re ned models of service constraints and have introduced state components located at the three parties transmitter, medium, and receiver. Fig. 3 the second service constraint process No Gaps is outlined. At rst it models the safety aspect of the absence of loss, namely that the sequence of packets delivered is free from gaps. The receiver manages a counter rctr and a message with key k only can be delivered if the message with key k ? 1 has been delivered before.
Secondly the liveness aspect is re ected by exclusion of the loss of non-delivered packets which is provided by restrictions to remove (the liveness is implied by this in connection with the fairness of the actions). A remove to rbuff is enabled only if its key is less than rctr, to tbuff and sbuff only after it has been forwarded to the next bu er. The third service constraint process No Duplicates of our example is outlined in Fig. 4) . The transmitter manages a counter sctr and assigns a corresponding unambiguous key to each message submitted. The receiver keeps track of the key of the next message expected by means of the counter rctr and excludes the delivery of duplicates.
The compositional service speci cation of one transfer direction can be built now by a composition of the three constraint processes the coupling of which de nes the equally-named actions of the processes to be performed jointly. Before we enter into the structured protocol veri cation we shall show that the compositional service speci cation indeed is a re nement of the monolithical service model. The proof { not outlined in detail { is based on the invariant Inv and the re nement mapping RM: Inv =^8 src,dest,k 9 i : rbuffg) The quali ers NC, NG, and ND refer to the three constraint processes, so e.g., ND:rctr s; d] denotes the receive counter state variable of process NoDuplicates with respect to the direction s to d. q denotes the queue state variable of the monolithical speci cation. The invariant Inv states helpful correspondences between the contents of the di erent bu ers and the counters. The de nition of the re nement mapping RM is based on the counters ND:sctr and ND:rctr which limit the number of messages in transfer, and on the send and receive bu ers NC:sbuff and NC:rbuff which contain such messages.
In the next step we will design a compositional protocol system consisting of protocol mechanism processes implementing the di erent service constraints. Three resource-oriented components model the underlying network and the two protocol entities. The protocol entities are compositions of constraint-oriented mechanism processes. At rst, a speci cation of the network Wire Just Loses is given. It is reliable except for the loss of messages (which may be a realistic assumption when due to reliable physical media only bu er-over ow loss of packets is probable). 
The process Buffers describes one basic XTP protocol entity and will be parametrized by the address Station of the site assigned to. It contains a send bu er SB and a receive bu er RB including messages which are indexed by the address of the station,the address of the transfer partner, and the message key. ? denotes empty bu er elements. The communication with the user of the protocol is described by the actions submit and deliver. Because XTP distinguishes between control and information packets, sending and receiving is split into actions send info, send ctrl, rec info, and rec ctrl. The removal of bu er elements is described by the actions sendremove and rcvremove. We have to mention that here some actions are not disjoint to stuttering and therefore do not meet the style conventions. One can easily repair this by introduction of additional state variables (e.g., action counters). RM We have presented a compositional speci cation style and proposed its application for the speci cation and analysis of high-speed transfer protocols. In particular, the approach facilitates the protocol veri cation since it supports the corresponding decomposition of proofs and opens the chance of re-using component proofs. Also, it provides a framework for the investigation of protocol spectra which are de ned by mechanism composition. To show the suitability of the approach it has been applied to the example XTP and central aspects of this application were reported. On-going work concentrates on the establishment of libraries of protocol mechanisms, service constraints, and corresponding proof information, on the basis of which the functional aspects of high-speed mechanism combinations will be studied. Furthermore, several existing tools for the computer-assisted handling of TLA-speci cations (syntax-directed editor, graphical system editor, interpreter, model-checker, theorem-prover frontend) will be tailored to the speci c eld of application.
